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RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT 
IN THE TRUMP ERA 
Stephen B. Burbank* & Sean Farhang** 
INTRODUCTION 
Our aim in this Article is to leverage the archival research, data, and 
theoretical perspectives presented in our book, Rights and Retrenchment:  
The Counterrevolution against Federal Litigation,1 to illuminate the 
prospects for retrenchment in the current political landscape.  In the book, we 
documented how an outpouring of rights-creating legislation from 
Democratic Congresses in the 1960s and 1970s, much of which contained 
provisions designed to stimulate private enforcement, prompted the 
conservative legal movement within the Republican Party to devise a 
response.  Recognizing the political infeasibility of retrenching substantive 
rights, the movement’s strategy was to weaken the infrastructure for 
enforcing them.  Although largely a failure in the elected branches and only 
modestly successful in the domain of court rulemaking, the project flourished 
in the federal courts. 
In both the book and this Article, we focus exclusively on law that bears 
on opportunities and incentives for private enforcement of federal rights.  Our 
decision to limit the project in that way was based on considerations that are 
both practical and theoretical.2  It was fortified by evidence from our archival 
research that the counterrevolution started in the first Reagan administration 
as an ideological campaign against private litigation as a tool of federal 
policymaking and by our empirical data showing that the effort to retrench 
private enforcement of federal law preceded tort reform on both the 
administration’s and the legislative agenda during the Reagan years.3 
 
*  David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice at the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School. 
**  Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the 
University of California, Berkeley.  We appreciate the helpful comments of Ed Purcell.  This 
Article was prepared for the Fordham Law Review Symposium entitled Civil Litigation 
Reform in the Trump Era:  Threats and Opportunities held at Fordham University School of 
Law on February 23, 2018. 
 
 1. See generally STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT:  
THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017). 
 2. See id. at xvii–xix. 
 3. Although the law we study is often made in the context of the enforcement of federal 
rights (e.g., attorney’s fees, damages, and private rights of action), many of the legal rules of 
interest to us, notably those contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are 
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We follow the scheme of the book by separately considering the prospects 
for federal litigation retrenchment in three lawmaking sites:  Congress, 
federal court rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act,4 and the Supreme 
Court.  Although pertinent data on current retrenchment initiatives are 
limited, our historical data and comparative institutional perspectives should 
afford a basis for informed prediction.  Of course, little in the Trump era has 
thus far been predictable. 
As in the book, we start with a brief discussion of the revolution that 
preceded—and elicited—the retrenchment efforts that we chronicle.  That 
revolution created the Litigation State.5  Understanding the interests that 
created it, how they did so, and for what purposes is essential to uncovering 
the dynamics that led the proponents of the counterrevolution to seek to 
dismantle it. 
I.  THE RISE OF THE LITIGATION STATE 
In the twentieth century, a bedrock axis distinguishing the Democratic and 
Republican Parties was the Democrats’ greater support for an interventionist 
state in the sphere of social and economic regulation, much of which targeted 
private business.6  By the late 1960s, there was mounting disillusionment on 
the left with the capacities and promise of the American administrative state, 
which was propelled by growth in the number, membership, and activism of 
liberal public interest groups.  An activist state, particularly one prepared to 
regulate private business, was exactly what the agenda of liberal public 
interest groups called for, from nondiscrimination on the bases of race, 
gender, age, and disability; to workplace and product safety; to cleaner air 
and water; to truth in lending and transparent product labeling. 
The liberal coalition pursued a number of reform strategies to address the 
problems underpinning its disillusionment with the administrative state, its 
anxiety about presidential ideological influence on the federal bureaucracy, 
and its concern about nonenforcement of congressional mandates.  One set 
of strategies was to advocate statutory rules that circumvented the 
administrative state altogether by fostering direct enforcement of legislative 
mandates through private lawsuits against the targets of regulation.  Private 
enforcement is a form of insurance against the president’s failure to use the 
bureaucracy to carry out Congress’s will. 
These reasons to choose private enforcement became much more 
significant to American public policy starting in the late 1960s, when divided 
party control of the legislative and executive branches became the norm and 
relations between Congress and the president became more antagonistic.  
Growing ideological polarization between the parties exacerbated the 
 
transsubstantive—as are many legislative proposals to change them—so that our analysis and 
conclusions are likely to have broader purchase. 
 4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–75 (2012). 
 5. See generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE (2010). 
 6. For an in-depth discussion of the emergence of the Litigation State, see BURBANK & 
FARHANG, supra note 1, at 4–16. 
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institutional friction arising from divided government.  If antagonism 
between Congress and the president encourages resort to private 
enforcement, this will be especially consequential when the more regulation-
prone Democratic Party controls Congress (and is writing regulatory 
mandates) and the less regulation-prone Republican Party controls the 
presidency (and is appointing the leadership of agencies tasked with 
implementing them).  The bulk of the foundation for the Litigation State was 
laid under this configuration of divided government. 
When Congress elects to rely on private litigation by including a private 
right of action in a statute, it faces a series of additional choices of statutory 
design—such as who has standing to sue, how to allocate responsibility for 
attorney’s fees, and the nature and magnitude of damages that will be 
available to winning plaintiffs—that together can have profound 
consequences for how much or how little private enforcement litigation will 
actually be mobilized.  We refer to this constellation of rules as a statute’s 
“private enforcement regime.”7 
In Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress decided to make the 
prohibition against job discrimination enforceable in court by including an 
express private right of action and a pro-plaintiff attorney’s fee-shifting 
provision.8  Experience under Title VII demonstrated that private 
enforcement can be effective, as the federal judiciary proved a more 
hospitable enforcement venue than anyone expected.  Moreover, private 
rights of action with fee shifting proved unexpectedly potent in cultivating a 
private enforcement infrastructure in the American bar.  As a result, civil 
rights groups mobilized to spread legislative fee shifting across the entire 
field of civil rights, and the liberal coalition embraced private enforcement 
as a reform strategy for numerous other regulatory statutes. 
From 2006 through 2015, more than 1.25 million private federal lawsuits 
were filed to enforce federal statutes, spanning the waterfront of federal 
regulation.9  The rate of three lawsuits per 100,000 population in 1967, which 
had been stable for a quarter century, increased by about 1000 percent over 
the following three decades (thirteen by 1976, twenty-one by 1986, and 
twenty-nine by 1996).10  This phenomenon was closely associated with self-
conscious statutory design choices by members of Congress seeking to 
mobilize private enforcers. 
 
 7. See Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 
17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 671–79 (2013). 
 8. See generally FARHANG, supra note 5, at 94–128.  In amending Title VII in 1991, 
Congress sought to ensure active use of the private right of action by supplementing attorney’s 
fee awards with, in certain cases, compensatory and punitive damages and the right to trial by 
jury. See generally id. at 172–213. 
 9. For a breakdown by year of federal civil case filings, see generally C-3, U.S. CTS., 
www.uscourts.gov/data-table-numbers/c-3 [https://perma.cc/PM29-Z6NT] (last visited Aug. 
24, 2018).  In order to determine the number of federal statutory actions, we sum the number 
of cases in each year classified in the table as “actions under federal question” that are “private 
cases” arising under “federal question” jurisdiction. 
 10. See FARHANG, supra note 5, at 15. 
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The solid line in Figure 1 reflects the cumulative number of fee-shifting 
provisions and damages enhancements (double, triple, or punitive) attached 
to private rights of action existing in federal statutory law in each year from 
1933 to 2014.  The dashed line is the annual rate, per 100,000 population, of 
private federal statutory enforcement litigation.11  The strikingly close 
association between these two variables, and particularly the coincident sharp 
upward shift in both at the end of the 1960s, reinforces the significance of 
legislatively designed private enforcement regimes in mobilizing private 
litigants and creating the Litigation State.12 
Figure 1:  Cumulative Federal Statutory Plaintiffs’ Fee-Shifting and 
Damages-Enhancement Provisions, and Federal Private Statutory 
Litigation Rate, 1933–2014 
 
II.  THE COUNTERREVOLUTION:  PAST AND FUTURE 
Although the movement that catalyzed the growth of the Litigation State 
was successful, it gave rise to a countermovement.  The counterrevolution’s 
strategy has been to leave substantive rights in place while retrenching the 
infrastructure for their private enforcement.  We divide our investigation of 
the counterrevolution according to its three main institutional strategies:  
(1) to amend existing or enact new federal statutes to reduce opportunities 
and incentives for private enforcement; (2) to amend existing or fashion new 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to do the same; and (3) to use litigation to 
 
 11. It is only possible to distinguish private- from public-enforcement actions beginning 
in 1942. 
 12. For a discussion of the data underlying Figure 1, see FARHANG, supra note 5, at 3–18, 
60–84. 
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elicit federal court interpretations of private enforcement regimes, Federal 
Rules, and other legal rules that demobilize private enforcers. 
A.  The Elected Branches 
1.  The Past 
In Chapter 2 of our book,13 we traced the emergence, growth, and 
substantial failure of a movement in the elected branches to constrict 
opportunities and incentives for the private enforcement of federal rights.  
We showed that the growth of litigation as an instrument to implement social 
and economic regulation soon met opposition emanating primarily from the 
emerging conservative legal movement and the Republican Party.  With little 
prospect of repealing legislative mandates in the new social regulatory 
statutes, the Reagan administration’s principal strategy for implementing its 
deregulatory agenda was to demobilize the administrative regulatory 
enforcement apparatus.  However, the deregulatory value of weakening 
administrative enforcement would be diminished if extensive private 
enforcement continued.  The first Reagan administration thus initiated 
proposals to curtail economic incentives for private enforcement (particularly 
fee awards) under federal regulatory statutes.  It also sought to retrench 
private enforcement through legislation. 
John Roberts, then in the Justice Department, initiated ambitious proposals 
to alter civil rights enforcement through amendments to section 1983, which 
were not pursued.  He was also an active participant in deliberations over the 
administration’s broad-ranging bill to reduce attorney’s fees available under 
more than one hundred statutes in suits against government.  
Notwithstanding differences of opinion within the administration about the 
political wisdom of pursuing the bill, Roberts joined those advocating for it.  
In explaining why, he stated, “This legislation will, of course, be opposed by 
the self-styled public interest bar, but the abuses that have arisen in the award 
of attorney’s fees against the government clearly demand remedial action.”14  
Antonin Scalia endorsed the fee bill as well.  Writing as a University of 
Chicago law professor and editor of the American Enterprise Institute’s 
magazine, Regulation (just months before his appointment to the D.C. 
Circuit), Scalia argued that recent D.C. Circuit pro-fee-award decisions were 
a “bad dream” in need of the administration’s legislative remedy and that the 
bill would surely be opposed by the “private attorney general industry.”15  
Although their advocacy of retrenchment legislation in the 1980s failed, 
Roberts and Scalia were to become among the most anti-private-enforcement 
 
 13. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 25–64. 
 14. See id. at 33–34. 
 15. The Private Attorney General Industry:  Doing Well by Doing Good, REGULATION, 
May/June 1982, at 5, 5–7; see also BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 34. 
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justices to serve on the Supreme Court in a period spanning more than fifty 
years.16 
Congressional Republicans followed suit, introducing a sharply escalating 
series of bills that sought to amend existing federal statutes to limit fees and 
damages and, later, to amend federal procedural law by statute so as to 
constrict private enforcement.  In order to map the legislative movement for 
private enforcement retrenchment and its partisan configuration in Congress, 
we identified all bills that sought to amend federal law so as to (1) reduce the 
availability of attorney’s fees to plaintiffs or increase plaintiffs’ liability for 
defendants’ fees; (2) reduce the monetary damages that plaintiffs can 
recover; (3) reduce opportunities and incentives for class actions; 
(4) strengthen the operation of sanctions against counsel; and (5) strengthen 
the operation of offer-of-judgment rules.  Our search captured 500 bills from 
1973 (when the Library of Congress bill database starts) through 2014. 
Figure 2 reflects, separately for Democratic and Republican legislators, 
smoothed estimates of the number of episodes per Congress of legislators 
sponsoring or cosponsoring one of our litigation reform items.  The Ninety-
Seventh Congress (1981–82) is the first in which Republican support for anti-
litigation measures in our dataset exceeds Democratic support.  From rough 
parity when Reagan took office, there emerged a partisan gap that grew to its 
highest levels in the 103rd to 106th Congresses (1993–98), hitting its apex in 
the 105th Congress (1995–96), with Republicans supporting anti-litigation 
proposals at a level about 580 percent above Democrats.  As the level of 
Republican proposals declined after the 105th Congress, so did the gap 
between the parties. 
   
 
 16. In cases in our dataset with at least one dissent, Justice Scalia had the lowest 
percentage (11 percent) of pro-private-enforcement votes and Chief Justice Roberts the next 
lowest (12 percent). BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 151 tbl.4.4. 
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Figure 2:  Republican and Democratic Support for Private Enforcement 
Retrenchment, 1973–2014 
 
Ultimately, we documented the substantial failure of this Republican 
legislative project in the elected branches and the reasons for that failure.  
The Reagan administration abandoned private-enforcement retrenchment 
through legislation after concluding that it was widely perceived as “anti-
rights” and threatened unacceptably high political and electoral costs to the 
administration, thwarting any realistic prospects of success in the legislative 
process.  Congressional Republican proposals, we show, largely failed as 
well, even after Republicans achieved unified control of Congress in the mid-
1990s.  Only 11 of the 500 bills in our data were enacted.  Three Republican 
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successes are well known:  the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (PSLRA),17 the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996,18 and the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).19  We do not question the significance 
of these laws.  Indeed, we believe that CAFA may be more significant to the 
retrenchment of private enforcement of federal law than is generally 
recognized.20  That said, two of the three laws are narrowly focused.  In 
addition, both of the class action statutes required many years to enact and 
encountered vetoes and filibusters along the way, and, in the view of one of 
the most prominent scholars in the area, the PSLRA did not change much.21 
The eight other Republican bills that passed were of no significance to the 
broader policy project of litigation reform. In sum, Republican litigation-
reform successes across the issues in our database, over the three decades 
from the emergence of the issue on the Republican agenda in 1981 until 2014, 
nibbled around the edges of the Litigation State.  They did not directly 
challenge it. 
To understand the substantial failure of the legislative project, we 
identified institutional factors that make retrenchment of rights by statute 
difficult.  An institutionally fragmented American separation-of-powers 
system empowers many actors to block legislation, which makes legislative 
change difficult on contentious issues and leads to the stickiness of the status 
quo.  This is especially true when the legal change sought involves divesting 
groups of existing rights, and even more so when those rights enjoy a broad 
base of support.  The phenomenon of “negativity bias” (or an “endowment 
effect”)22 means that people are substantially more likely to mobilize to avoid 
losses of existing rights and interests, as compared to securing new ones.  It 
also leads voters to be more likely to punish politicians who have impaired 
their interests than to reward politicians who have benefited them, making 
retrenchment electorally hazardous.  Politicians well understand this 
dynamic. 
 
 17. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 18. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-34, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 19. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 20. CAFA significantly increased the number of state law class actions governed by a 
transsubstantive and ever-more-conservative federal class action jurisprudence.  In pushing so 
hard for and against this legislation, members of Congress signaled their awareness that the 
heart of the campaign against private enforcement reposed where its architects in the Reagan 
administration came to believe that it should be:  in the federal courts. See BURBANK & 
FARHANG, supra note 1, at 141 (“The counterrevolution had been put in the hands of those 
best equipped institutionally to achieve its goals.”). 
 21. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION:  ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE 
125–26 (2015) (“[N]ot that much has actually changed.”). 
 22. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 51. 
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2.  The Future 
As the top panel of Figure 2 reflects, Republican support for legislative 
retrenchment was at its highest levels in the 103rd to 109th Congresses 
(1993–2006) and peaked in the 104th Congress (1995–96).  Subsequently, 
the estimated volume of Republican support for litigation retrenchment 
proposals in Congress declined through 2014, when the data for our book 
ended.  By the close of the period we studied, Republican support for 
litigation retrenchment had declined to levels comparable to the end of the 
1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. 
In 2017, the House passed the Fairness in Class Action Litigation and 
Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2017,23 a bill that 
aggressively limits class actions.  It also passed the perennially introduced 
Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2017,24 a bill designed to strengthen Rule 
11 sanctions.  These legislative developments raise the question whether we 
are witnessing a Trump era revival of Republican legislative retrenchment 
efforts in Congress—a Trump-led reversal of the long-run decline in the 
party’s legislative retrenchment program. 
To assess this, we extended our bill data forward to cover 2015 through 
2017.  We find that there has, in fact, been a recent reversal in the decline, 
although the size of the shift is not large when viewed in historical 
perspective, and it does not quite correspond to the Trump presidency.  
According to our bill data indicators, the rebound in Republican support for 
legislative retrenchment began in the 114th Congress (2014–16) and has 
continued into the current Congress.  The magnitude of the effect is notable 
but not extremely large.  The level of litigation-retrenchment bill activity by 
Republicans is higher than we observed in the last three Congresses (2009–
14) and is comparable to the 110th Congress (2007–08).  Although that is a 
far cry from the high levels of Republican litigation retrenchment activity in 
Congress in the 1993–2006 period, we would certainly regard it as a material 
elevation of litigation retrenchment on the Republican legislative agenda if it 
were sustained or continued in a new upward trajectory. 
Although we cannot identify the cause of this reversal with confidence, we 
do offer a hypothesis.  With the exception of 2001 to 2002, the Republicans 
held unified control of Congress from 1995 to 2006.  They never held unified 
control of Congress from the 110th to 113th Congresses (2007–13), when 
their level of support for litigation-retrenchment bills declined to its lowest 
levels since the issue emerged as a source of partisan cleavage and a 
Republican agenda item in the early 1980s.  The recent revival of the issue 
on the Republican agenda corresponds to their capture of unified control in 
2014 for the first time since 2006.  This may be because they are newly 
optimistic about their capacity to actually enact contested legislation. 
 
 23. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017); see 163 CONG. REC. H1974–2000 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 
2017). 
 24. H.R. 720, 115th Cong. (2017); see 163 CONG. REC. H2025–41 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 
2017). 
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How one conceives of the relationship between the Trump era and the 
resurgence of litigation retrenchment on the Republican legislative agenda 
depends on what one means by the “Trump era.”  The resurgence (if it proves 
to be that) emerged in the 114th Congress—commencing two years before 
Trump took office.  In that sense, the President deserves neither credit nor 
blame (depending on one’s perspective).  Alternatively, one may view the 
consolidation of legislative power in a Congress under unified Republican 
control—a victory delivered by voters under a Democratic president—as 
signaling the broader realignment that led to the Trump presidency.  From 
that perspective, it is plausible to regard the Republican rebound in attention 
to litigation retrenchment, after a period of relative indifference, as being of 
a piece with the Trump era. 
Are we on the verge of significant change via litigation retrenchment in 
the Trump era?  We very much doubt that.  Unified Republican control of 
Congress and the presidency certainly are auspicious developments for any 
Republican legislative project.  But as we demonstrated in our book, 
divesting groups of existing rights is especially challenging within the veto-
point-ridden American legislative process and, for this reason, Republican 
legislative efforts at litigation retrenchment have rarely succeeded with 
substantively significant legislation.25  Indeed, we doubt that any litigation-
retrenchment bill as potentially consequential as the Fairness in Class Action 
Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2017, 
currently pending before the Senate, has ever been enacted in the forty-five-
year period we have studied.  Even under unified Republican government, 
the legislative process includes the filibuster in the Senate.  The distinctively 
potent group mobilization associated with efforts to withdraw existing rights 
guarantees that assertive litigation retrenchment, such as the two bills 
mentioned above, will be made sufficiently politically salient to stimulate 
Democratic use of the filibuster.  In fact, a much weaker version of the class 
action bill passed the House in the 114th Congress and died in the Senate,26 
as did the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act.27  This scenario has been recurrent.  
As in so many policy domains, controversial legislation is far more likely to 
pass the House than the Senate. 
One success in the current Congress illustrates how important the filibuster 
is in blocking Republican efforts at litigation retrenchment by legislation, and 
how its elimination might change the landscape.  Congress passed, and 
President Trump signed, legislation to rescind the Obama-era Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau rule that would have prohibited providers of 
certain consumer financial products from using arbitration agreements to 
prevent consumers from pursuing class actions.28  After the bill passed the 
House, the Senate tied 50-50, with two Republicans (John Kennedy of 
 
 25. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 50–58, 217–26; supra notes 17–19 and 
accompanying text. 
 26. See H.R. 1927, 114th Cong. (2016); 162 CONG. REC. H200–10 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 2016). 
 27. See H.R. 758, 114th Cong. (2015); 161 CONG. REC. H6112–21 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 
2015). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (2017). 
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Louisiana and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina) declining to vote in favor 
of rescission.  Vice President Mike Pence broke the tie in favor of passage.29  
Under the Congressional Review Act, recently finalized federal regulations 
may be rescinded by a simple majority vote in both chambers.30  With the 
filibuster operative, the legislation would have stood no chance of passage.  
The episode provides a glimpse into an alternative institutional universe. 
We make one final observation about Republican legislative preferences 
on litigation in the Trump era (loosely defined).  When updating the data for 
the 114th and 115th Congresses, we observed a remarkably high level of 
Republican-proposed and cosponsored bills relying on private rights of 
action with attorney fee shifting to enforce Republican regulatory 
preferences and serve Republican constituencies.  These bills included, for 
example, use of private rights of action with fee recovery to enforce anti-
abortion policy against doctors,31 enforce rights to possess and transport 
firearms against local and state authorities seeking to prohibit such conduct,32 
obtain damages from “alien” immigrants for injuries they cause,33 and obtain 
multiple damages from unions for injuries caused by a labor slowdown.34 
Although Republican advocacy for private enforcement regimes to serve 
their constituencies is not new, we believe that there has been significant 
escalation in such proposals in recent years (a development that is the subject 
of an ongoing project we are working on).  Perhaps ironically, a signature of 
Trump era litigation reform may be an escalation of efforts to dismantle the 
Litigation State of civil rights, environmental regulation, and consumer 
protection, and replace it with a new Litigation State in the service of an anti-
abortion, anti-immigrant, anti-union, and pro-gun agenda.  It is too early to 
tell whether the Republican Party will have the political capacity to translate 
this agenda, reflected in its proposed bills, into statutory law. 
B.  Rulemaking 
1.  The Past 
In Chapter 3 of our book, we used qualitative and quantitative evidence to 
identify the role of federal court rulemaking in the counterrevolution against 
private enforcement of federal law.35  We compiled original data, which span 
1960 to 2014, in which we identified every person who served on the Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee.  We recorded rulemakers’ key characteristics 
salient to our study, including party of the appointing president for federal 
judges and type of practice for practitioners (corporate versus individual 
 
 29. See 163 CONG. REC. S6738–60 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2017). 
 30. See 5 U.S.C §§ 801–08 (2012). 
 31. Prenatal Non-Discrimination Act of 2018, S. 2326, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 32. Sportsmen’s Heritage and Recreational Enhancement Act, H.R. 3668, 115th Cong. 
(2018). 
 33. Securing America’s Future Act of 2018, H.R. 4760, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 34. Preventing Labor Union Slowdowns Act of 2017, S. 702, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 35. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 65–129. 
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representation and defendant versus plaintiff representation).  We showed 
that under Chief Justice Warren Burger and his successors, all of whom were 
appointed by Republican presidents, the Advisory Committee came to be 
dominated by federal judges appointed by Republican presidents and, among 
its practitioner members, by corporate lawyers (and, toward the end of the 
study period, by corporate defense lawyers). 
The ideological slant of federal judge appointments to the Committee, on 
average, has been fairly stable from Burger through Roberts.  In statistical 
models with controls (including year-fixed effects to account for the pool of 
Article III judges eligible to be appointed and other potentially confounding 
year-level variables), we found that Republican-appointed federal judges 
have had about double the probability of service on the Committee.  We also 
presented models demonstrating still-larger party effects in service and 
appointment as chair of the Committee.36 
To investigate the Advisory Committee’s output over the period 1960 to 
2014, we collected every proposed amendment to the Federal Rules sent 
forward by the Advisory Committee (there were 262 proposals at the rule 
level), evaluated each, and identified those salient to private enforcement and 
whether they were pro- or anti-plaintiff (or neither) in the direction of their 
likely effects.  The top panel of Figure 3 presents the distribution over time 
of the forty-four proposals affecting private enforcement from 1960 through 
2014.37  The bottom panel of Figure 3 presents the net balance, in years in 
which there were proposals affecting private enforcement, between pro-
plaintiff and pro-defendant proposals.  Pro-plaintiff proposals were coded 1; 
pro-defendant proposals were coded -1, and a single proposal that was evenly 
divided between pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant elements was coded 0.  The 
bars in the bottom panel of Figure 3 represent the sum of all values of 1, 0, 
and -1 in each year. 
 
 36. See id. at 89–91.  In terms of the raw data, “the percentage of Republican-appointed 
judges on the federal bench serving as chair is 17 times larger than the percentage of 
Democratic-appointed judges so serving.” Id. at 91. 
 37. This number includes multiple proposals when it was possible to identify discrete 
groups within rules.  There were thirty-three proposals affecting private enforcement at the 
rule level. 
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Figure 3:  Number and Direction of Advisory Committee Proposals 
Affecting Private Enforcement, 1960–2014 
 
In no year did the values sum to 0, and thus in every year in Figure 3 with 
no bar, there were no proposals forwarded to the Standing Committee 
affecting private enforcement that could be characterized as predictably 
favoring plaintiffs or defendants.  The Figure reflects that, by the end of the 
period, proposals affecting private enforcement were infrequent, with none 
occurring between 2006 and 2014, but when they did occur, as in 2014, they 
were anti-plaintiff.  Post-1980, there has been only one year (1991) with 
proposals affecting private enforcement that netted a pro-plaintiff direction, 
and, even then, just marginally so. 
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Figure 4 reflects the probability of a pro-plaintiff proposal over time, 
which is conditioned on the existence of a proposal affecting private 
enforcement.  After increasing in the early 1960s, the predicted probability 
that a proposed amendment would favor plaintiffs declined from 87 percent 
in the mid-1960s to 19 percent by the end of the series. 
Figure 4:  Probability of Pro-Plaintiff 
Advisory Committee Proposal, 1960–2014 
 
We are confident that most of the Advisory Committee’s work is 
unaffected by members’ ideological preferences.  Our data confirmed that, 
as we suspected, few of the Committee’s proposals predictably implicate 
private enforcement.  However, we believe that, at least since the 
counterrevolution became a partisan project in the elected branches, the 
rulemaking proposals most likely to elicit ideological behavior have been 
precisely those that would affect private enforcement.  Yet, based on 
qualitative evaluation of those proposals, ambitious retrenchment efforts 
have been less frequent than one might have predicted based on salient 
characteristics of Committee members.  Although Chief Justice Burger was 
successful in stanching the flow of Federal Rules in the 1960s that favored 
private enforcement, his hopes for bold retrenchment through rulemaking 
were largely frustrated.  In the period we studied, court rulemaking was a site 
of only episodic and modest retrenchment. 
To explain this limited success, we placed particular emphasis on 
institutional reforms to the rulemaking process in the 1980s.  In the early 
1980s, influential rights-oriented interest groups and Democratic members 
of Congress came to believe that the Advisory Committee was embracing the 
goals of the counterrevolution, and the Committee’s anti-enforcement work 
product (e.g., the 1983 amendments to Rule 11) elicited a backlash.  The 
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resulting changes in the rulemaking process, including some imposed 
through legislation enacted by a Democratic Congress in 1988,38 required 
public meetings, widened opportunities for interest group participation, 
increased the Committee’s burden of justification to support rule changes, 
and enhanced opportunities for Congress to veto rule changes. 
Drawing on institutional scholarship about congressional oversight of 
bureaucracy, we argued that the effect, and for some proponents, the purpose, 
of these changes was to insulate the pro-enforcement status quo.  The 1980s 
reforms ensured that interest groups with a stake in the subject of proposed 
rulemaking could provide pertinent information to the rulemakers and serve 
as whistleblowers or fire alarms for members of Congress in the event they 
thought something was seriously wrong.  The reforms also effectively 
increased the evidentiary burden on the Advisory Committee when seeking 
to change the status quo and increased the threat of veto.  The reforms were 
a control strategy designed to ease the legislative costs of monitoring the 
rulemakers ex post, while at the same time increasing monitoring capacity ex 
ante.  We concluded that the reforms did, in fact, contribute to the stickiness 
of the rulemaking status quo, making bold retrenchment since the 1980s 
difficult to achieve even for those who were ideologically disposed to it. 
The evidence also suggested to us that, even within a designedly sticky 
process, the Chief Justice and the leaders of the rulemaking committees can 
exercise important influence on the ambition or restraint of proposed 
reforms.  Thus, on several occasions in the first decade of the new 
millennium, the Advisory Committee, with careful attention to the Rules 
Enabling Act’s limitations and to data, prevented improvident proposals from 
going forward.39  Moreover, prominent rulemakers celebrated these 
examples of restraint as evidence that the Rules Enabling Act process 
works.40 
Consider also the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation organized by the 
Advisory Committee (the “Duke Conference”).41  On the one hand, 
notwithstanding the evident hope of some who attended the event that it 
would function as a catalyst of major retrenchment, in their report to the 
Chief Justice, the chairs of the Advisory Committee and the Standing 
Committee provided no encouragement on the issue that, for forty years, was 
the brass ring for the rulemaking counterrevolution:  the scope of discovery.42  
 
 38. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401, 
102 Stat. 4642, 4649 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(2), (d) (2012)). 
 39. See Mark R. Kravitz et al., They Were Meant for Each Other:  Professor Edward 
Cooper and the Rules Enabling Act, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 495, 515–19 (2013). 
 40. See id. at 515–24; cf. Richard L. Marcus, Shoes That Did Not Drop, 46 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 637, 637 (2013) (“[W]hat the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules does not do is, in 
some ways, as important as what it does.”). 
 41. See 2010 Civil Litigation Conference, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/archives/projects-rules-committees/2010-civil-litigation-
conference.aspx [https://perma.cc/68AQ-ZWSM] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
 42. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 
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On the other hand, in 2013 the Advisory Committee, under new leadership 
and with the approval of the Standing Committee, which was also under new 
leadership, published for comment proposals to amend the discovery rules 
that in significant respects contradicted the summary previously provided to 
the Chief Justice and that were decidedly anti-private enforcement.43  Apart 
from, and even prior to, new leadership on both committees, it appears that 
the impulse for restraint was overwhelmed by a call to action from the Chief 
Justice,44 who, it should be recalled, was one of the architects of the 
counterrevolution when serving in the first Reagan administration.  Indeed, 
once the amendments (which included a number of potentially significant 
changes to the 2013 proposals) became effective, he devoted his entire 2015 
year-end report to the amendments and emphasized that “[t]hey mark 
significant change, for both lawyers and judges, in the future conduct of civil 
trials,” with the result that, although they “may not look like a big deal at first 
glance . . . they are.”45 
It remains to be seen whether Chief Justice Roberts’s characterizations of 
the 2015 discovery amendments are (1) spin designed to influence lower 
court judges to adopt interpretations not supported by the text, drafting 
history, or Advisory Committee Note;46 or (2) vindication of those who 
regarded proponents’ claims that the amendments were “modest” as a 
smokescreen:  sheep’s clothing for a wolf.47 
 
CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 8 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ 
report_to_the_chief_justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/KBR6-6FYW]. 
 43. See generally COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 264–66 (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ 
files/fr_import/ST2013-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LVD-RU6N]. 
 44. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 123.  As we noted in our book: 
In 2014 one of the authors asked a member of the Advisory Committee about the 
inconsistency between the report of the Duke Conference . . . and the tenor of 
subsequent deliberations and proposals concerning the scope of discovery.  The 
member responded that the Chief Justice had reacted to the report by strongly 
encouraging the Chair of the Advisory Committee to make use in rulemaking of the 
information acquired for and at the Conference. 
Id. 
 45. 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5 (2015), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
27QU-QCDJ]. 
 46. See generally Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era?:  Federal Civil Procedure After 
the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1 (2016). 
 47. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Comment Letter on Preliminary Draft of Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3–4 (Feb. 10, 2014), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0729 
[https://perma.cc/393W-UD6G].  Again, the Advisory Committee made a number of 
potentially significant changes to the 2013 proposals, which eliminated some proposals that 
had elicited strong objections, and revised the Advisory Committee Note.  Professor 
Steinman’s view of the final product, and therefore of the nature of the Chief Justice’s 
characterizations, rests substantially on a prediction about the effect of those changes. See 
generally Steinman, supra note 46. 
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2.  The Future 
From 2014 to 2017, the Chief Justice added four Article III judges, one 
practitioner, and one academic to the Advisory Committee.48  As of October 
2017, the Committee comprised six Article III judges, one magistrate judge, 
one state court judge, four practitioners, and one academic.49  Four of the six 
Article III judges, including the Chair, were appointed to the bench by 
Republican presidents,50 and both the magistrate judge and the state court 
judge had received appointments by Republican administrations, federal or 
state.51  The four practitioners appear to be more evenly divided along the 
dimensions we charted in the book, although only one of them routinely 
represents individual plaintiffs and, as has become the norm, that 
representation is in complex aggregate litigation.52  Thus, to the extent that 
ideology plays a role in the work of the Advisory Committee—which seems 
to us most likely when a rule is salient to private enforcement—and to the 
extent that the party of the appointing president (or other appointing 
authority) is a reliable basis for predicting the direction of votes on rule 
proposals that trigger ideological behavior, we might expect to see some anti-
private-enforcement proposals.53 
Looking at the Committee’s work product since 2014, of the eight 
proposals (at the rule level), the great majority, if not all, were either not 
salient to private enforcement or not directional (i.e., either clearly pro-
plaintiff or pro-defendant).54  Yet, this finding is not surprising.  In the entire 
 
 48. Two individuals appointed in 2014, one magistrate judge and one practitioner, were 
not included in the data we used for our book because, attending their first meeting in October 
2014, they did not participate in decisions that led to any of the proposals that we studied. 
 49. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA OF NOVEMBER 7, 2017, at 9–11 
(2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-11-CivilRulesAgendaBook_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/88HT-YGBT].  We include in this count only individuals appointed by the 
Chief Justice and thus do not include the representative of the Department of Justice.  The 
Reporter and Associate Reporter, who are academics, are also not included. 
 50. The Article III judges (and their appointing presidents) are:  Hon. John D. Bates 
(G. W. Bush), Hon. Robert Michael Dow, Jr. (G. W. Bush), Hon. Joan N. Ericksen (G. W. 
Bush), Hon. Sara Lioi (G. W. Bush), Hon. Scott M. Matheson, Jr. (Obama), and Hon. Brian 
Morris (Obama). See Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789–Present, 
FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges [https://perma.cc/73BM-8VT5] (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
 51. For the background of the magistrate judge, Hon. Craig B. Shaffer, see Craig Shaffer, 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Craig_Shaffer [https://perma.cc/9QQX-2KYT] (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2018).  For the background of the state court judge, Hon. David F. Nahmias, 
see Justice David E. Nahmias, SUP. CT. GA., https://www.gasupreme.us/court-
information/biographies/justice-david-e-nahmias/ [https://perma.cc/WLB6-GVKZ] (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
 52. The four practitioners are John M. Barkett, Esq., Parker C. Folse, Esq., Virginia A. 
Seitz, Esq., and Ariana J. Tadler, Esq. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 49, 
at 13. 
 53. As has been true for most of the last twenty-five years, an ideologically driven 
retrenchment proposal of the Advisory Committee that ripened into a proposed amendment 
promulgated by the Supreme Court during the Trump era would not be at risk of override 
through legislation. 
 54. The proposals in question were:  in 2015, proposals to amend Rules 4(m), 6(d), and 
82; in 2016, a proposal to amend Rule 4(m); and in 2017, proposals to amend Rules 5, 23, 62, 
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1960–2014 period, only 33 of 262 proposals at the rule level would 
predictably affect private enforcement.  The many years in Figure 3 where 
there is no bar above or below the line reflect years when there were no such 
proposals.55 
There is, however, something about the Committee’s recent work product 
that may cause surprise to some observers, particularly those who saw in the 
2015 discovery amendments the opening wedge in a more ambitious 
campaign to retrench through rulemaking.  Arguably, the only salient 
proposal at the rule level is the currently pending collection of proposed 
amendments to Rule 23.56 
Given that the potential significance of proposals to amend the class action 
rule dwarfs the potential significance of all other proposals from 2015 to 
2017 combined, it is striking that none of them has sufficiently clear 
implications for private enforcement to warrant directional coding according 
to our standards.57 
There are numerous possible explanations for this finding.  One possible 
explanation is that this Rule 23 experience is evidence that Advisory 
Committee members not only try to be but are immune both to the ideological 
currents that propel positions of individuals and interest groups on both sides 
of a proposed Federal Rule change that would affect private enforcement and 
to the predisposing effects of their own ideology.58  If intended to describe 
the work of the Advisory Committee in general, past and present, that 
explanation is not supported by our data.59  Moreover, even if Chief Justice 
 
and 65.1.  All rule proposals going forward from the Advisory Committee to the Standing 
Committee can be found in various minutes and reports. See generally Records and Archives 
of the Rules Committees, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-
archives-rules-committees [https://perma.cc/6ZGV-8YY4] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
 55. We characterize proposals as not affecting private enforcement when they seek to 
amend (or add) rules that (1) are not salient to private enforcement, or (2) are salient to private 
enforcement but would not themselves predictably affect it. 
 56. STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT 
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 274–93 
(2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-09-jcus-report_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8HXL-M5VA].  The proposals were approved by the Judicial Conference, 
adopted by the Supreme Court, and transmitted to Congress on April 26, 2018. See Pending 
Rules and Forms Amendments, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/pending-
rules-and-forms-amendments [https://perma.cc/B898-9MRN] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
 57. For an interesting account of the 2017 Rule 23 proposals, which are on track to become 
effective December 1, 2018, see generally Richard Marcus, Revolution v. Evolution in Class 
Action Reform, 96 N.C. L. REV. 903 (2018).  “In sum, revolutionary change to class action 
practice is not currently emerging from the rules process.” Id. at 942. 
 58. See id. at 915–16 (“[T]he debates during the current rulemaking effort significantly 
reflect competing conceptions of this [compensation versus deterrence] divide, and one could 
say that there is again a studied effort by the rulemakers to avoid embracing the strongest 
position on either side.”). But see Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, 
Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?:  Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive 
Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 838, 886–87 (2009) (discussing “cognitive illiberalism,” 
which involves the ability to see the influence of cultural predispositions on others but not on 
oneself, often leading to a “dismissive and even contemptuous posture toward . . . opponents’ 
beliefs”). 
 59. See supra Figure 4. 
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Roberts was spinning the 2015 discovery amendments, the salience and 
directionality of a number of the Committee’s discovery proposals, even as 
revised, make us doubt the explanation’s persuasiveness, standing alone,60 
for the Rule 23 proposals, which started to take shape during the same period. 
In fact, we think that comparing rulemaking as to discovery and class 
actions in historical and institutional perspective is illuminating for this 
purpose.  Doing so suggests that, although controversy has attended 
rulemaking retrenchment attempts in both areas since 1970, interinstitutional 
dynamics have played out in very different ways. 
The transsubstantive effort to retrench discovery was for decades 
essentially confined to the rulemaking domain,61 where it has not generally 
been thought to pose problems under the Enabling Act.  Such influence as 
the other lawmaking sites may have had seems to have come from the 
judiciary, and it was more likely to serve as prod than brake.  That is how we 
interpret Chief Justice Roberts’s involvement in the 2015 discovery 
amendments, both in jump-starting the effort and in promoting the resulting 
amendments after they became effective.  In addition, it seems possible that 
both the Chief Justice and some members of the Advisory Committee may 
have been influenced by the Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly62 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,63 which were predicated in part on the 
perceived inability of federal judges, under the existing rules, to exercise 
needed control of discovery.64 
Class action retrenchment looks different in historical and institutional 
perspectives.  The Advisory Committee that Chief Justice Burger 
reconstituted in 1971 was a disappointment to him in part because, although 
it gave priority to Rule 23 (probably at his initiative), it spent six years 
studying possible amendments, with no proposal seeing the light of day.  One 
reason for the Committee’s glacial progress was growing awareness of 
controversy engendered by early experience under the 1966 amendments and 
questions about their validity under the Rules Enabling Act, both of which 
 
 60. At the level we use for statistical purposes, three of the amendments salient to private 
enforcement were anti-private enforcement, while one was pro-private enforcement.  The tilt 
against private enforcement is even more pronounced at the most granular level we use for 
comparison. 
 61. We ran searches in the congressional bill database seeking to identify litigation 
retrenchment proposals targeting discovery.  We found that discovery-retrenchment proposals 
were overwhelmingly focused on discrete policy domains, such as stays of discovery while a 
motion to dismiss is pending (as in the PSLRA) and discovery in intellectual property 
litigation.  Interestingly, the only arguably transsubstantive discovery-retrenchment proposals 
we found were linked to class action retrenchment, in the form of proposals limiting discovery 
pending disposition of a motion for class certification.  Although our investigation of this issue 
was not exhaustive, it supports the firm conclusion that discovery has been far less likely than 
class actions to be the target of transsubstantive litigation-retrenchment proposals in Congress.  
We did observe a fair number of bills reflecting transsubstantive concerns about protective 
orders, but such bills seek to make the fruits of discovery more widely available, not to 
retrench discovery. 
 62. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 63. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 64. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–60; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684–86. 
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were crystallized by the Carter administration’s legislative proposal to repeal 
and replace Rule 23(b)(3).  In the wake of that initiative, the Advisory 
Committee abandoned the effort for more than a decade.65 
By the time the Advisory Committee returned to class actions in the early 
1990s, the rulemaking-process changes of the 1980s were in place.  As a 
result, attempts to consequentially amend Rule 23 were sure to promote 
intense and motivated interest group participation, with the capacity to 
imperil the perceived legitimacy of the Rules Enabling Act process.  The fact 
that Congress was embroiled in aspects of class action retrenchment during 
essentially the entire period that the Advisory Committee was at work—in 
the prolonged lawmaking efforts that finally yielded the PSLRA and 
CAFA—can only have highlighted the institutional stakes, dampening the 
zeal for ambitious retrenchment even of members otherwise favoring it.66 
The difference in the levels of congressional interest in these two domains 
suggests, as does the difference in sensitivity to rulemaking about them under 
the Rules Enabling Act,67 that Congress and interest groups like the Chamber 
of Commerce care more about legislative retrenchment of class actions than 
of discovery.  If so, one reason may be that legislatively restricting class 
actions has greater potential to affect disfavored types of litigation than does 
legislatively restricting discovery.  Another reason may be that, in most types 
of litigation, class actions have asymmetrically negative effects on business 
when compared to discovery, the utility of which in business-to-business 
litigation is a constant deterrent to unrestrained retrenchist zeal. 
Congress appeared to lose interest in class action retrenchment a decade 
or so ago, and the recent resurgence of interest that we discuss in Part II.A.2 
manifested a few years after the Advisory Committee again took up possible 
amendments to Rule 23, leading to the pending proposals.  In our book, we 
suggested that the decline in legislative activity may have reflected, as CAFA 
strongly suggests, awareness among proponents of retrenchment in Congress 
that the federal courts were likely to be more effective in that enterprise.68  
Our data, which tracked only decisions of the Supreme Court, support that 
proposition.69  Moreover, our qualitative work yielded the conclusion that, 
as with pleading, so also with class actions:  the conservative majority of the 
 
 65. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 97–101. 
 66. In our book, we suggested that the prolonged legislative effort necessary to enact the 
PSLRA, which required numerous compromises and produced statutory language and 
legislative history that constrained the Supreme Court’s retrenchment efforts, may help to 
explain why a number of the Court’s pro-private-enforcement class action decisions of recent 
years have involved securities class actions. See id. at 139–40. 
 67. The limitations on rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act are limitations on 
delegated legislative power that seek to protect the lawmaking prerogatives of Congress. See 
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1106–08 
(1982). 
 68. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 140–41; see also supra note 20 and 
accompanying text. 
 69. See, e.g., BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 178 (discussing trends in Federal 
Rules cases).  “In the past 15 years, plaintiffs are losing, and business defendants are winning, 
a huge majority of Federal Rules private enforcement cases, and this field is the locus of 
increasingly intense conflict among the justices.” Id. 
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Court effectively sought to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under 
the guise of interpretation.70  We see again that lawmaking in one site may 
reduce lawmaking ambition or flexibility in another. 
Here, the impulse to restraint in the Advisory Committee may have 
reflected concern that the Court had staked out class action retrenchment for 
itself.  Even if so, it may also have reflected the belief among members of 
both institutions that, if the envelope was to be pushed, better that it be 
pushed by the Court in decisions less likely to attract wide public notice, with 
little risk to that institution’s perceived legitimacy,71 than by the rulemakers, 
whose remit includes protecting the lawmaking mechanism that affords the 
judiciary its greatest power to craft the rules governing federal practice and 
procedure.72  Either consideration (or both of them) might explain why the 
rulemakers chose to put on hold some matters urged upon them, such as issue 
classes, settlement class certification, ascertainability, and “pick-off” 
issues.73  All four matters are likely to tap into ideological views about the 
class action, and most are closely connected to doctrinal issues that the Court 
has considered in its recent class action jurisprudence. 
Finally, by way of comparison of class action and discovery retrenchment, 
something akin to path dependency may also help to explain the differences 
in the rulemakers’ ambition that are suggested by our data.  Once the 
rulemaking changes of the 1980s were in place, the fraught and institutionally 
complex project of class action retrenchment called out for leadership that 
was politically astute.  Those changes, institutional sensitivity, and the 
epistemically shallow foundation of the 1966 amendments called out for 
broad consultation and policy grounded, within reason, in empirical 
evidence.  Those commitments yielded but one amendment in the 1990s,74 a 
package of process-oriented amendments in 2003, and self-conscious 
restraint throughout.  The same commitments characterized the process by 
which the current proposed Rule 23 amendments were fashioned.  It is a 
testament to the restraint, thoroughness, and inclusiveness of the process 
 
 70. See id. at 141–42.  See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 71. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 192–216, 220–26. 
 72. See id. at 121. 
 73. See Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Minutes 11–12 (Jan. 7, 2016), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/st01-2016-min_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LB3-
HS9R].  Professor Marcus discusses the Advisory Committee’s decisions not to pursue these 
issues, as well as cy pres and “no injury” classes, in his recent article. See Marcus, supra note 
57, at 923–33.  “[I]n general they . . . illustrate the ongoing challenge of emphatic embrace of 
either the pure compensation or the pure deterrence rationale.” Id. at 923. 
 74. As we have noted, although this provision (Rule 23(f)), which permits discretionary 
appeals from class certification decisions, is facially neutral, it “enabled and highlighted 
another path to retrenchment of private enforcement by substantially expanding the 
opportunities for conservative federal appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, to 
control the course of class action jurisprudence.” Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class 
Actions and the Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1515 
(2017). 
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followed that the published proposals elicited fewer than ninety written 
comments.75 
Operating in the less fraught and institutionally complex environment of 
discovery retrenchment in the late 1990s, with different leadership in charge 
of the project, the rulemakers evidently believed that they had greater 
freedom from, for example, any commitment to heed reliable empirical 
evidence.76  Prodded to renewed action by the Chief Justice ten years later, 
following the Duke Conference, still enjoying greater perceived freedom to 
pursue ambitious retrenchment through the Rules Enabling Act process, and 
reassured that such proposals would survive any veto attempt in Congress, 
the rulemakers chose a course that was bound to provoke intense controversy.  
Their published proposals elicited 2356 written comments.77  As we 
previously suggested, it remains to be seen how much of the controversy will 
be dissipated by the changes made in the proposals finally submitted.  This 
will depend upon whether federal courts administering discovery share the 
view that the resulting amendments are modest changes posing little threat to 
plaintiffs’ access to information necessary to effective prosecution of their 
claims, or if they believe the Chief Justice’s contrary claim that “[t]hey mark 
significant change” and are “a big deal.”78 
C.  THE SUPREME COURT 
1.  The Past 
In Chapter 4 of our book,79 we showed that those wishing to retrench 
private enforcement of social and economic regulation also waged a 
campaign in the courts.  The goal was the same:  to constrict opportunities 
and incentives for the enforcement of federal rights, with a focus on such 
issues as standing, damages, fee awards, and class actions.  They learned that 
retrenching rights enforcement by changing statutory law was politically and 
electorally perilous and unlikely to succeed and that an increasingly public 
and participatory rulemaking process would yield only modest and episodic 
retrenchment.  They thus pressed federal courts to interpret, or reinterpret, 
existing federal statutes and procedural rules to achieve the same purposes.  
 
 75. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, REGULATIONS.GOV, 
https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=25&so=DESC&sb=commentDueDate&po
=0&dct=PS&D=USC-RULES-CV-2016-0004 [https://perma.cc/LJ3Z-B7LL] (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2018).  There were ninety-one comments on all of the proposals published for 
comment, the great majority about the proposed amendments to Rule 23. See id. 
 76. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 114–15 (noting the Advisory Committee 
Chair’s explanation that renewed effort was due to “persistent pressure for litigation 
retrenchment from elite elements of the bar and a report from President Bush’s Council on 
Competitiveness issued in 1991,” which contained a claim about the cost of discovery that 
lacked empirical support). 
 77. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, REGULATIONS.GOV, 
https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002 
[https://perma.cc/D9L5-AFAF] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
 78. 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 45, at 5. 
 79. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 130–91. 
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The federal courts were increasingly staffed by judges appointed by 
Republican presidents, some of whom had participated in the Reagan 
administration’s failed efforts to retrench rights through legislation. 
In marked contrast to its substantial failure in Congress and modest success 
in the domain of rulemaking, the counterrevolution against private 
enforcement of federal rights achieved growing rates of support, especially 
over the past several decades, from an increasingly conservative Supreme 
Court.  For the period from 1960 to 2014, we identified all Supreme Court 
decisions requiring justices to vote on (1) the existence or scope of a private 
right of action, either express or implied; (2) whether a party has standing to 
sue under either Article III or prudential analysis; (3) the availability of 
attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff; (4) the availability of damages to a 
prevailing plaintiff; (5) whether an arbitration agreement forecloses access to 
court to enforce a federal right; and (6) an interpretation of a Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure that bore on opportunities or incentives for private 
enforcement.  This rendered a dataset of 369 cases, with 406 discrete private 
enforcement issues and 3507 individually coded justice votes on private 
enforcement issues. 
We found that, in cases with at least one dissent, plaintiffs’ probability of 
success when litigating private enforcement issues in the Supreme Court was 
in decline for over 40 years and that by 2014 they were losing in the vast 
majority of cases.  Figure 5 plots a regression line estimating the probability 
of an outcome in favor of private enforcement and the separate probabilities 
of conservative and liberal justices’ votes in favor of private enforcement in 
cases with at least one dissent.  By 2014, when the issue in question elicited 
any disagreement at all, the pro-private-enforcement side was losing an 
estimated 86 percent of the time, with conservative justices voting against 
private enforcement 90 percent of the time.  Over the same period, the 
probability of a pro-private-enforcement vote by liberal justices actually 
increased from 67 percent to 78 percent.  The distance between liberals and 
conservatives grew from 30 percentage points in 1970 to 68 percentage 
points in 2014, and the growing polarization between the justices on private 
enforcement issues was driven primarily by the increasingly anti-private-
enforcement votes of the conservative justices. 
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Figure 5:  Probability of Pro-Private-Enforcement Outcomes and Justice 
Votes in Private-Enforcement Issues with Dissents, 1960–2014 
 
Moreover, we demonstrated that the effect of ideology on justices’ votes 
in private-enforcement cases grew significantly larger over time, especially 
starting in the mid-1990s.  During that time, the Court’s private-enforcement 
docket came to focus increasingly on business regulation cases, and it was 
associated with increasing advocacy against private enforcement by the 
Chamber of Commerce and conservative law reform organizations.  
Remarkably, at the end of the series, justices were more ideologically 
polarized over apparently technical rules of private enforcement than they 
were over the actual substantive rights in statutes. 
In the concluding chapter of our book, we argued that institutional theory 
provides important insights that help to explain the variation we observed 
across institutional sites in the success of the campaign to retrench private 
enforcement.  We identified four distinguishing institutional characteristics 
that have the greatest explanatory value in assessing the reasons for the 
Supreme Court’s relative success.80  First, as contrasted with the institutional 
fragmentation of the legislative and rulemaking processes, the Court is 
governed by a more streamlined decisional process and simple voting rules, 
which make it comparatively more capable of unilateral action by simple 
majority vote on controversial issues.  Indeed, we suggested that the growing 
polarization between conservative and liberal justices over private 
enforcement issues, which is particularly striking in the Court’s Federal 
Rules decisions, may reflect a narrow but determined conservative majority 
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pressing its advantage in pursuit of the counterrevolution’s goals and the 
liberal justices’ response. 
Second, legislators and presidents are democratically accountable through 
elections.  This accountability limits their ability to retrench existing rights 
that enjoy broad popularity.  As our archival research demonstrated, 
prominent among the influences that doomed the Reagan administration’s 
legislative initiatives was the fear, abetted by extensive press coverage of its 
fee-capping bill, that the public would regard the bills as further evidence 
that the administration was hostile to civil rights and punish the bills’ elected 
sponsors in the 1984 elections. 
Members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules are not elected.  Yet, 
rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act involves the exercise of delegated 
legislative power.  Widespread public perception that the members of the 
Advisory Committee, including in particular its Article III judge members, 
were engaged in ordinary politics could bring the process into disrepute, 
which would put at risk the major source of the federal judiciary’s power to 
craft rules of procedure. 
Federal judges (when acting as such, rather than serving as rulemakers) 
are far more insulated from the forces and incentives of democratic politics 
than elected officials or rulemakers, which gives the Court greater freedom 
to act decisively on divisive issues.  To be sure, the Court is not immune to 
public opinion.  Its power in the long run—its independence—depends on 
the continued existence of a well of diffuse support, the depth of which could 
be adversely affected by a series of unpopular decisions, including, in 
particular, decisions perceived to deprive people of rights enjoying broad 
support.  The strategy of retrenching private enforcement of rights, rather 
than the rights themselves, enables justices who share the goals of the 
counterrevolution to avoid eroding diffuse support for the Court, even when 
the decisions in question do not track public opinion, because the public is 
unlikely to be aware of them. 
Third, in an era of divided government and party polarization, the Court 
has faced less credible threats of statutory override and correspondingly has 
enjoyed a wider range of policy-making discretion.  With Republicans 
controlling at least one chamber of Congress nearly continuously since 1995, 
the prospect of Congress overriding the decisions of a conservative majority 
of the Court has usually been vanishingly small.  The growth of the influence 
of ideology on justices’ votes on private enforcement issues after 1994 is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the Court has exercised wider policy-
making discretion during this period, with the conservative majority pushing 
the law of private enforcement more assertively in the anti-enforcement 
direction, which elicited increased opposition from the liberal minority. 
Finally, the Court’s success was fostered by the lower visibility of its 
retrenchment efforts as compared to those of Congress or the Advisory 
Committee.  The story of retrenchment of private enforcement by court 
decision is one of substantial change effected in large part by many 
comparatively small acts of lawmaking over decades, few of which garnered 
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much public or press attention.  Moreover, when courts elect a strategy of 
incremental and evolutionary change, their opinions will typically frame each 
step using a style of legal justification that encourages popular “belief that 
judicial decisions are based on autonomous legal principles” and “that cases 
are decided by application of legal rules formulated and applied through a 
politically and philosophically neutral process of legal reasoning,”81 with 
outcomes framed in “legalistic” terms dictated by such sources as detailed 
legal text, legislative history, and precedent.82 
2.  The Future 
We anticipate that the Court will continue as the institutional leader in the 
project to retrench private enforcement in the near future for two reasons.  
First, we see little reason to anticipate a change in preferences in the Court’s 
membership.  One seat has turned over since 2014, and a second has been 
vacated, with the appointment of a new justice now in process.  The first 
departing member—Justice Scalia—had the most anti-private-enforcement 
voting record among all justices to serve in the past half century in cases with 
at least one dissenting vote.  Given that numerous important decisions 
affecting private enforcement in recent years have been decided 5 to 4 in the 
anti-enforcement direction, Scalia’s replacement by a materially less anti-
enforcement justice could be consequential. 
Justice Gorsuch voted in only two cases presenting an issue in our 
Supreme Court opinion data through 2017,83 and we do not have data on his 
voting record on these issues on the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.  
Thus, we lack a meaningful individual-level empirical basis to evaluate 
Gorsuch’s preferences on private-enforcement issues.  At the same time, in 
our book we showed that on the contemporary Court there are strong patterns 
of justices voting on private-enforcement issues in coalitions associated with 
the political party of their appointing president.84  Indeed, we showed that in 
the current era such partisan ideological voting was more common on 
private-enforcement issues than on merits issues.85  We also showed that 
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 83. In Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017), Justice Gorsuch 
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to pursue relief different from that sought by a party with standing.  In California Public 
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ideological conservatism among justices is strongly associated with anti-
private-enforcement preferences.86  Thus, we expect that Justice Gorsuch 
will vote with the conservative wing of the Court on private-enforcement 
issues and that the Court’s strongly anti-enforcement posture will continue. 
A second reason that we see little basis to expect change is institutional.  
We argued in our book that Republican control of at least one chamber of 
Congress almost continuously since 1995 increased the conservative wing’s 
latitude to effectuate litigation retrenchment, making the probability of 
statutory override of anti-private-enforcement decisions “vanishingly 
small.”87  It is even smaller under a unified Republican Congress and with 
Trump controlling the presidential veto. 
We reviewed cases addressing the issues in our Supreme Court data, 
enumerated above, in the 2015–17 period.  In these last few years, plaintiffs 
have done much better than the estimated probability of a pro-enforcement 
outcome at the end of the data represented in Figure 5.  However, the Figure 
reflects smoothed predicted probabilities (long-run averages), and, based 
only on the last few years, it is impossible to predict whether the trajectory 
of those long-run averages will change.  We doubt that it will.  In that regard, 
it is noteworthy that only three of the cases we identified in the 2015–17 
period were decided before Justice Scalia’s death and that in all of them 
Justice Kennedy joined the Court’s liberals to create pro-private-enforcement 
majorities.88  Moreover, Justice Gorsuch did not participate in ten of the other 
twelve of these cases, a fact that is potentially significant both when 
interpreting the results in those cases and when considering case selection 
during the long period when the Court had only eight members. 
The second departing member—Justice Kennedy—announced his 
retirement while this Article was in production.  Kennedy’s retirement may 
portend a further shift on the Court in the anti-enforcement direction, 
although probably not a big one.  As we just noted, Kennedy sometimes 
joined the Court’s four liberal justices to forge bare majorities in the pro-
enforcement direction.  This, however, has been the exception and not the 
rule, which is evident when one views aggregate-level voting behavior. 
On the Court as it existed prior to Scalia’s death, Kennedy was the median 
justice on private enforcement issues with at least one dissenting vote, but he 
was still solidly on the conservative side.  In the Supreme Court data analyzed 
in our book, Kennedy voted against private enforcement 76 percent of the 
time.  The four justices to his right on private enforcement issues (Scalia, 
Roberts, Thomas, and Alito), on average, voted against private enforcement 
87 percent of the time.89  The four justices to his left (Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan), on average, voted against private enforcement 
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19 percent of the time.  Although Kennedy was the median on private 
enforcement, he was far from centrist.90 
As of this writing, Kennedy has not been replaced.  If he is replaced by a 
justice who is in the vicinity of the conservative justices identified above on 
private enforcement—which we cannot predict but which seems probable—
it will likely contribute, at the margin, to the Court’s further movement in an 
anti-private-enforcement direction.  Thus, we expect that the Court’s anti-
private-enforcement posture will be sustained, if not deepened, in the 
foreseeable future. 
 
 90. The averages given for the four justices to Kennedy’s right, and the four to his left, 
are each simply the average of their voting percentages given in Table 4.4. See id.  Each 
justice’s voting percentage is based on all votes on our private enforcement issues from the 
time of appointment through the end of 2014. 
